16 February 2022
Wednesday, 16 February 2022, 15:00-16:15
Presenter: Voliotis Dimitris, University of Piraeus
Τhis study examines a simple banking system in a game-theoretic framework wherein banks act as self-interested agents to maximize leverage at the expense of overall financial stability. The resultant strategic inefficiency raises concerns about how banks manage the “financial stability” good, which is appropriated into a “tragedy of the commons”. We conceptualize the inefficiency using the -price of anarchy- introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou .We seek the optimal regulatory framework that minimizes the -price of anarchy- or the degree of financial fragility.
Zoom link: https://zoom.us/j/97374751400?pwd=UjZ4cUVaSXZ2bnZUT1BNSVhySFlDQT09